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fix(chat): tighten runtime internal-message filtering and add targeted tests (#891)

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This commit is contained in:
paisley
2026-04-22 17:23:57 +08:00
committed by GitHub
parent 36282fce35
commit c29ff4dd33
3 changed files with 101 additions and 2 deletions
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32
src/stores/chat.ts
View File

@@ -934,10 +934,40 @@ function isToolResultRole(role: unknown): boolean {
/** True for internal plumbing messages that should never be shown in the UI. */
function isInternalMessage(msg: { role?: unknown; content?: unknown }): boolean {
if (msg.role === 'system') return true;
const text = getMessageText(msg.content);
if (msg.role === 'assistant') {
const text = getMessageText(msg.content);
if (/^(HEARTBEAT_OK|NO_REPLY)\s*$/.test(text)) return true;
}
// Runtime system injections: these arrive as user or assistant-role messages
// but are internal plumbing (exec results, async-command notices, time pings, etc.)
if ((msg.role === 'user' || msg.role === 'assistant') && isRuntimeSystemInjection(text)) return true;
return false;
}
/**
* Detect runtime-injected system messages that should be hidden from the chat UI.
* These are injected by the OpenClaw runtime as user-role messages and include:
* - "System (untrusted): ..." — exec results, tool output, etc.
* - "An async command you ran earlier has completed" — async completion notices
* - "Current time: ..." followed by nothing else — periodic heartbeat time pings
* - "Handle the result internally. Do not relay it to the user" — internal directives
*/
function isRuntimeSystemInjection(text: string): boolean {
if (!text) return false;
const normalized = text.trim();
if (/^\s*System\s*\(untrusted\)\s*:/i.test(normalized)) return true;
if (
/An async command you ran earlier has completed/i.test(normalized)
&& /Do not relay it to the user unless explicitly requested/i.test(normalized)
) {
return true;
}
if (
/^\s*Current time\s*:/i.test(normalized)
&& /^\s*Current time\s*:[^\n]*\/\s*\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}\s+\d{2}:\d{2}\s+UTC\s*$/i.test(normalized)
) {
return true;
}
return false;
}

39
src/stores/chat/helpers.ts
View File

@@ -737,10 +737,47 @@ function isToolResultRole(role: unknown): boolean {
/** True for internal plumbing messages that should never be shown in the UI. */
function isInternalMessage(msg: { role?: unknown; content?: unknown }): boolean {
if (msg.role === 'system') return true;
const text = getMessageText(msg.content);
if (msg.role === 'assistant') {
const text = getMessageText(msg.content);
if (/^(HEARTBEAT_OK|NO_REPLY)\s*$/.test(text)) return true;
}
// Runtime system injections: these arrive as user or assistant-role messages
// but are internal plumbing (exec results, async-command notices, time pings, etc.)
if ((msg.role === 'user' || msg.role === 'assistant') && isRuntimeSystemInjection(text)) return true;
return false;
}
/**
* Detect runtime-injected system messages that should be hidden from the chat UI.
* These are injected by the OpenClaw runtime as user-role messages and include:
* - "System (untrusted): ..." — exec results, tool output, etc.
* - "An async command you ran earlier has completed" — async completion notices
* - "Current time: ..." followed by nothing else — periodic heartbeat time pings
* - "Handle the result internally. Do not relay it to the user" — internal directives
*/
function isRuntimeSystemInjection(text: string): boolean {
if (!text) return false;
const normalized = text.trim();
// "System (untrusted): ..." at the start (with optional leading whitespace)
if (/^\s*System\s*\(untrusted\)\s*:/i.test(normalized)) return true;
// Async command completion notice + internal relay directive commonly arrive together.
// Require both markers to avoid hiding normal conversational text that quotes one phrase.
if (
/An async command you ran earlier has completed/i.test(normalized)
&& /Do not relay it to the user unless explicitly requested/i.test(normalized)
) {
return true;
}
// Standalone time injection (e.g. "Current time: Wednesday, April 22nd, 2026 - 10:06 (Asia/Shanghai) / 2026-04-22 02:06 UTC")
// Only match when the full message is the time announcement.
if (
/^\s*Current time\s*:/i.test(normalized)
&& /^\s*Current time\s*:[^\n]*\/\s*\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}\s+\d{2}:\d{2}\s+UTC\s*$/i.test(normalized)
) {
return true;
}
return false;
}