# Data Flow

## Primary Flows

| Flow | Source | Destination | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Business directive | Manual workbench or AgentBus | Route orchestrator | Manual input uses the signed-in account; AgentBus input uses the channel's bound employee account and its route allowlist. |
| AgentBus execution ownership | Enabled channel | Employee account → immutable task assignee → executable feed | One account owns at most one channel; unbound channels and unassigned historical tasks stay non-executable. |
| Manual account authorization | Signed-in account plus resolved business route | Intake and task-transition gates | Administrators hold all routes; team leads/users require explicit grants and unresolved routes fail closed |
| Parsing | Route orchestrator | AI Skill or deterministic Program parser | AI/Shadow/Auto/Program mode is frozen per task |
| Operation | Parser | Control-plane task and confirmation | Must validate against the same final contract |
| ERP execution | Confirmed task | Chrome extension and logged-in ERP page | Requires unique object, page identity, ownership, and write preflight |
| Completion evidence | ERP response/requery | Control-plane receipt and business reply | Evidence is action-specific; uncertain writes fail closed |
| Passenger workbook | Single `.xls/.xlsx` attachment | Deterministic encrypted canonical TSV | Exactly one complete ERP-semantic header is detected in rows 1–100 through finite aliases and arbitrary column order; exact leader-contact rules remain. |
| WeChat roster attachment | Strict transport envelope plus one structured `payload.attachments[]` entry | Existing `awaiting_attachment` task | Explicit conversation ID wins; otherwise strict `Conversation:` supplies the fallback. Placeholder text alone never creates a task. |
| Internal attachment download | Credential-free HTTPS URL | Bounded in-memory workbook bytes | Internal/private DNS answers are allowed; the selected address is pinned, every redirect is revalidated, and URL/host/IP/bytes are omitted from logs. |
| Operational diagnostics | Service, request, task, parser, AgentBus, attachment, database, and cleanup stages | Structured stdout/stderr and bounded Docker logs | Correlation identifiers, codes, outcomes, and durations only; no secrets or business payloads. |
| Platform operations oversight | Manual task creator, encrypted instruction history, and readable outcome | Team-lead/administrator leadership projection | Display-only summaries plus explicit filters drive an aggregate-first task/person/input/output/time/type/completion view; list reads are bounded to one read-only connection and hydrate full details only for the current page. |
| Team-lead task summary | Future stable manual/AgentBus task outcome for another non-admin employee | Role/channel reconciler → current-owner encrypted route → separate durable outbox → leader-owned AgentBus channel → WeChat | Automatic for active team leads with a usable route; employee replies are sent first, summary frames use stable IDs and explicit routing with no `reply_to`, and delivery failure never changes task state. |
| Browser worker selection | Immutable task assignee | One fresh account-bound browser connection | The heartbeat must match the account's expected ERP identity; a second fresh worker or identity mismatch is non-executable, with failover only after staleness. |
| Account-scoped ERP queue | Confirmed task assignee | Assigned account's browser worker | Organization-plus-account advisory locking preserves FIFO and at most one active execution for that account; another account's active, queued, stale, or uncertain work is outside this queue. |
| Executable event and result routing | Immutable task assignee | Matching authenticated platform page and plugin | SSE history/live events, claims, plugin results, and browser cleanup commands never use administrator-wide visibility and fail closed when the authenticated account is not the assignee. |
| Task removal | Authorized operator | Archive/restore or permanent force delete | Archive/restore remains reversible and state-gated. Explicit force delete has no lifecycle-state gate, removes task-owned platform records atomically, retains a minimal deletion audit marker, and performs post-commit artifact/plugin cleanup best effort. |
| Confirmation export | ERP source file | Archived source plus mobile delivery artifact | Visitor XLS becomes real XLSX; other types prefer PDF |
| Release | Editable source | `dist/release-manifest.json` and versioned artifacts | Manifest owns current hashes and filenames |

## State Ownership

- PostgreSQL owns durable control-plane account, role, expected ERP identity, task-route grant, AgentBus channel owner, immutable task assignee, account-scoped queue/lease state, browser worker, session, confirmation, audit, archive, outcome state, and revisioned team-lead notification subscriptions/deliveries. Notification destinations and payloads remain encrypted at rest. A force-deleted task no longer exists in task state; only its minimal non-content deletion audit marker remains, while an already delivered external message cannot be retracted.
- Production attachment bytes use the configured OSS provider; normalized sensitive fields remain encrypted.
- Chrome extension local state is bounded execution/reconciliation support, not canonical business history.
- `.project-docs/30-worklog/tasks/` owns task-local project memory; canonical project state is an integrated projection.

## External Interfaces

- Operator workbench at the control-plane service.
- AgentBus WebSocket channels and attachment delivery.
- Logged-in ERP browser pages under the Chrome extension host permissions.
- PostgreSQL, OSS, deployment gateway, and authenticated artifact download.

## Last Updated

2026-09-07