import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
import test from 'node:test';
import { sha256Bytes } from '../src/crypto.js';
import {
  InputAttachmentError,
  createPinnedAttachmentLookup,
  decodeInlineInputAttachment,
  downloadAgentBusInputAttachment,
  parseAgentBusInputAttachment,
  resolveAgentBusAttachmentAddresses,
  validateAgentBusAttachmentUrl
} from '../src/input-attachment.js';

function codeOf(callback: () => unknown): string {
  try {
    callback();
    return '';
  } catch (error) {
    return error instanceof InputAttachmentError ? error.code : String(error);
  }
}

test('manual roster attachment base64 is bounded and hash verified', () => {
  const content = Buffer.from('PK\u0003\u0004synthetic-workbook');
  const decoded = decodeInlineInputAttachment({
    name: 'synthetic.xlsx',
    content_type: 'application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet',
    size: content.byteLength,
    sha256: sha256Bytes(content),
    content_base64: content.toString('base64')
  }, 1_000);
  assert.equal(decoded.fileName, 'synthetic.xlsx');
  assert.deepEqual(decoded.content, content);
  assert.equal(decoded.source, 'manual');
});

test('manual roster attachment rejects unsupported names, invalid base64 and mismatched hash', () => {
  assert.equal(codeOf(() => decodeInlineInputAttachment({
    name: 'synthetic.csv', content_base64: 'YQ=='
  }, 1_000)), 'roster_file_type_unsupported');
  assert.equal(codeOf(() => decodeInlineInputAttachment({
    name: 'synthetic.xls', content_base64: '%%%'
  }, 1_000)), 'roster_file_base64_invalid');
  assert.equal(codeOf(() => decodeInlineInputAttachment({
    name: 'synthetic.xls', sha256: 'a'.repeat(64), content_base64: 'YQ=='
  }, 1_000)), 'roster_file_sha256_mismatch');
});

test('AgentBus attachment URLs allow private HTTPS endpoints but reject unsafe URL syntax', () => {
  for (const value of [
    'http://files.example.test/list.xlsx',
    'ftp://files.example.test/list.xlsx',
    'https://user:secret@files.example.test/list.xlsx'
  ]) {
    assert.equal(codeOf(() => validateAgentBusAttachmentUrl(value)), 'roster_attachment_url_unsafe');
  }
  for (const value of [
    'https://files.example.com/list.xlsx',
    'https://localhost/list.xlsx',
    'https://127.0.0.1/list.xlsx',
    'https://10.0.0.8/list.xlsx',
    'https://[::1]/list.xlsx'
  ]) {
    assert.equal(validateAgentBusAttachmentUrl(value).protocol, 'https:', value);
  }
});

test('AgentBus attachment metadata is normalized without exposing URL credentials', () => {
  const reference = parseAgentBusInputAttachment({
    name: 'synthetic.xls',
    content_type: 'application/vnd.ms-excel',
    size: 128,
    sha256: 'a'.repeat(64),
    url: 'https://files.example.com/roster.xls'
  }, 1_000);
  assert.equal(reference.name, 'synthetic.xls');
  assert.equal(reference.size, 128);
  assert.equal(reference.sha256, 'a'.repeat(64));
});

test('AgentBus attachment DNS accepts internal names and private literal addresses', async () => {
  assert.deepEqual(await resolveAgentBusAttachmentAddresses('10.0.0.8'), [
    { address: '10.0.0.8', family: 4 }
  ]);
  assert.deepEqual(await resolveAgentBusAttachmentAddresses('fd00::8'), [
    { address: 'fd00::8', family: 6 }
  ]);
  const localhost = await resolveAgentBusAttachmentAddresses('localhost');
  assert.ok(localhost.length > 0);
  assert.ok(localhost.every((entry) => entry.family === 4 || entry.family === 6));
});

test('AgentBus attachment DNS pinning follows the Node lookup callback shape', async () => {
  const address = { address: '10.0.0.8', family: 4 };
  const lookup = createPinnedAttachmentLookup(address);
  await new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
    lookup('internal.example', { all: true }, (error, addresses, family) => {
      try {
        assert.ifError(error);
        assert.deepEqual(addresses, [address]);
        assert.equal(family, undefined);
        resolve();
      } catch (assertionError) {
        reject(assertionError);
      }
    });
  });
  await new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
    lookup('internal.example', { all: false }, (error, resolvedAddress, family) => {
      try {
        assert.ifError(error);
        assert.equal(resolvedAddress, address.address);
        assert.equal(family, address.family);
        resolve();
      } catch (assertionError) {
        reject(assertionError);
      }
    });
  });
});

test('AgentBus attachment diagnostics expose stages and codes without URL data', async () => {
  const events: Array<{ event: string; metadata: Record<string, unknown> }> = [];
  await assert.rejects(
    () => downloadAgentBusInputAttachment({
      name: 'synthetic.xls',
      contentType: 'application/vnd.ms-excel',
      size: 128,
      url: 'https://user:secret@127.0.0.1/private-roster.xls?token=secret'
    }, 1_000, (event, metadata) => events.push({ event, metadata })),
    (error: unknown) => error instanceof InputAttachmentError
      && error.code === 'roster_attachment_url_unsafe'
  );
  assert.deepEqual(events.map((event) => event.event), ['download_started', 'download_failed']);
  assert.equal(events[1].metadata.error_code, 'roster_attachment_url_unsafe');
  assert.doesNotMatch(JSON.stringify(events), /127\.0\.0\.1|private-roster|token|secret/u);
});

test('input attachment migration stores only encrypted normalized data and waiting-task index', async () => {
  const sql = await readFile(new URL('../migrations/014_task_input_attachments.sql', import.meta.url), 'utf8');
  assert.match(sql, /CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS task_input_attachments/);
  assert.match(sql, /normalized_text_ciphertext text/);
  assert.match(sql, /file_name_ciphertext text NOT NULL/);
  assert.doesNotMatch(sql, /\n\s*file_name text/);
  assert.doesNotMatch(sql, /public_url|content bytea|content_ciphertext/);
  assert.match(sql, /WHERE status = 'awaiting_attachment'/);
});