docs: accept leader summary notification architecture

.project-docs/30-worklog/current-state.md

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ This file is the integrated default-branch snapshot. Feature tasks record progre
 
 ## Integrated Through
 
+- Source commit `1a3ab63` from feature task `20260907-implement-leader-agentbus-copy-b7e31a94` for default-off team-lead task summaries over future manual and AgentBus outcomes, a separate encrypted/revisioned outbox, verified proactive AgentBus routing, administrator configuration/health UI, and migration 020; integration task `20260907-integrate-leader-summaries-84c1d7ea` accepted AUTH-003 and canonical notification boundaries.
 - Correction commit `fe1cc2cddc29e4dead81e53c16d31bb71493602d` from integration task `20260903-backup-revert-extension-update-c71a4e92` preserved the complete former `0.5.167`/migration-019 stack at remote branch `codex/backup-extension-update-20260903-b2e33e2`, removed the central private-OSS/ECS automatic-update service architecture without rewriting history, and retained the exact Chrome extension `0.5.167` source/package on the active main line with migration 018.
 - Merge commit `3224758` and integration task `20260903-finalize-extension-update-a6c4e192` remain historical records of the full-stack extension-update design. Only the plugin `0.5.167` release, adaptive entry readiness, and dormant plugin-side idle/reload safeguards remain active; the server orchestration is preserved on the backup branch only.
 - Commit `c4c469f4441d744627af2d34abe693b6783e833c` for the independently advanced remote deployment/extension line.
@@ -33,7 +34,7 @@ This file is the integrated default-branch snapshot. Feature tasks record progre
 
 ## Current Focus
 
-Operate the repository's current `0.5.167` extension baseline and fixed-scope account model safely, bind each enabled AgentBus channel to one employee/ERP identity, provision narrow route grants, use explicit leadership-dashboard filters, and preserve Program/AI plus per-assigned-account ERP execution boundaries. Same-account tasks remain FIFO and single-active; distinct accounts are independent, and administrator visibility never enters another account's executable event/result path. Migration 018, manual extension reload, guarded product-search retry, and service rollout remain separately authorized runtime work; server-side automatic extension updating is not part of the active main line.
+Operate the repository's current `0.5.167` extension baseline and fixed-scope account model safely, bind each enabled AgentBus channel to one employee/ERP identity, provision narrow route grants, use explicit leadership-dashboard filters, and preserve Program/AI plus per-assigned-account ERP execution boundaries. Same-account tasks remain FIFO and single-active; distinct accounts are independent, and administrator or team-lead visibility never enters another account's executable event/result path. Team-lead task summaries remain default-off until an administrator verifies the exact proactive route; migration 020, manual extension reload, guarded product-search retry, and service rollout remain separately authorized runtime work. Server-side automatic extension updating is not part of the active main line.
 
 ## Recently Completed
 
@@ -58,19 +59,21 @@ Operate the repository's current `0.5.167` extension baseline and fixed-scope ac
 - 2026-09-03: Accepted AUTH-002 and integrated account-scoped ERP queues. Each immutable assignee now owns one FIFO/single-active claim partition, different accounts no longer block one another, and executable SSE/results/cleanup commands are owner-only even when an administrator is signed in.
 - 2026-09-03: Restored explicit permanent force deletion as a separate operation from reversible archive/restore. It bypasses lifecycle-state gates, physically removes task-owned platform records, retains a minimal deletion audit marker, performs post-commit cleanup best effort, and warns that prior ERP effects are not rolled back.
 - 2026-09-03: Backed up the complete adaptive-readiness and central extension-update stack at remote branch `codex/backup-extension-update-20260903-b2e33e2`, then removed the central OSS/ECS update service and migration 019 from `main` with normal history-preserving commits. After correcting an initially over-broad rollback, the active repository retains the exact extension `0.5.167` source/package and uses migration 018; the removed server architecture was never deployed by these tasks.
+- 2026-09-07: Integrated AUTH-003 and migration 020 for administrator-managed team-lead task summaries. Future stable manual/AgentBus outcomes for other non-admin employees project into a separate encrypted outbox and use the leader's verified AgentBus/WeChat target without changing task ownership, employee reply priority, or ERP execution authority.
 
 ## In Progress
 
 - The standard database currently contains one administrator account and no non-administrator task grants. Multi-account operational smoke testing remains for an administrator-led staging window.
-- Migration `018_agentbus_account_workers`, employee ERP identities/channel bindings, extension `0.5.167`, account-scoped queue/routing changes, force-delete behavior, and the merged dashboard/runtime changes have not been applied to or restarted on the standard service in this integration task.
+- Required migrations through `020_leader_task_summary_notifications`, employee ERP identities/channel bindings, extension `0.5.167`, account-scoped queue/routing changes, force-delete behavior, and the merged dashboard/notification runtime changes have not been applied to or restarted on the standard service in this integration task. No production team-lead target is configured or enabled.
 
 ## Next Recommended Steps
 
-1. In an explicitly authorized staging/rollout window, back up PostgreSQL, apply migration 018, restart the control plane, manually load extension `0.5.167`, verify its runtime handshake, configure employee ERP identities and channel bindings, and run the multi-cloud-PC/identity/failover plus account-queue matrix before production assurance.
+1. In an explicitly authorized staging/rollout window, back up PostgreSQL, apply all migrations through 020, restart the control plane, manually load extension `0.5.167`, verify its runtime handshake, configure employee ERP identities and channel bindings, and run the multi-cloud-PC/identity/failover plus account-queue matrix before production assurance.
 2. Through the administrator UI, create representative team-lead and ordinary accounts, assign narrow task grants, and verify owner isolation, leadership dashboard reads, grant/revoke behavior, and denial prompts without ERP writes.
 3. In the same authorized staging window, verify that an administrator receives no employee executable events/results, then force-delete disposable waiting and active employee tasks and confirm database absence plus cleanup only in the owning employee plugin.
 4. With explicit authorization, run a live read-only ERP verification of the shared-mother-plan `tid-only` whole-visitor export path.
 5. With explicit authorization, perform ERP write verification for independent-order SGL/TWN and adult/child/leader headcount mappings.
+6. With explicit external-send authorization, configure one controlled team-lead route, verify proactive `task.summary` handling and stable-frame deduplication through AgentBus/WeChat, then observe one manual and one AgentBus task before wider enablement.
 
 ## Open Questions / Blockers
 
@@ -80,6 +83,7 @@ Operate the repository's current `0.5.167` extension baseline and fixed-scope ac
 - AgentBus account-worker routing still lacks a live two-employee/two-cloud-PC staging matrix covering mismatched ERP login, same-account device conflict, 90-second stale failover, same-account FIFO, cross-account independence, administrator executable-feed isolation, and both manual and automatic channel work.
 - Lifecycle-independent force deletion has repository regression evidence but lacks an authorized runtime smoke test for waiting/active deletion, database absence, OSS cleanup, and owner-plugin-only cleanup.
 - A live internal AgentBus attachment verification remains separately unperformed.
+- Proactive team-lead `task.summary` delivery has repository, mock-WebSocket, and disposable-PostgreSQL evidence but no deployed AgentBus/WeChat canary; exact production target verification and enablement remain pending authorization.
 
 ## Risky Areas
 
@@ -89,8 +93,9 @@ Operate the repository's current `0.5.167` extension baseline and fixed-scope ac
 - Account role changes, session revocation, creator-based task-route revocation, cross-user dashboard projection, and encrypted input audit are security-sensitive boundaries.
 - AgentBus channel ownership, immutable task assignment, expected ERP identity, browser-worker freshness/failover, and administrator non-execution are security- and write-safety-sensitive boundaries.
 - Account-scoped advisory locking, per-assignee FIFO queries, executable SSE/result routing, and irreversible force deletion are concurrency-, authorization-, and evidence-sensitive boundaries.
+- Team-lead summary target verification, encrypted projection/delivery rows, at-least-once stable-frame deduplication, privacy allowlisting, and non-retractable external delivery are authorization- and disclosure-sensitive boundaries.
 - Release synchronization across extension source, minimum platform version, mapping, ZIP, Skills, DOCX, and `dist/release-manifest.json`.
 
 ## Last Updated
 
-2026-09-03
+2026-09-07