docs: integrate leadership dashboard definition
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@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@ The platform already required login but treated the fixed deployment scope as a
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- Administrators manage account lifecycle, passwords, sessions, global settings/audit, AgentBus/system tasks, and all manual tasks. They always hold all 18 registered manual business routes.
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- Team leads and ordinary users use normal business APIs only for their own manual tasks. New non-administrator accounts start with no task-type grants and may invoke only routes explicitly granted by an administrator.
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- Re-read route authorization before intake and relevant task state transitions. Known denied routes and unknown/non-unique routes fail closed before parsing, plugin dispatch, or ERP execution.
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- Give team leads a dedicated read-only operations dashboard over all manual account tasks. It exposes who acted, the business instruction, and the readable business result, but not parser/executor payloads or mutation authority.
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- Give team leads a dedicated read-only platform-operations dashboard over all manual account tasks. It is an aggregate-first leadership view across task, person, original input, final output, time, task type, and completion state; every aggregate may drill into the same bounded business-facing task projection.
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- Keep the leadership dashboard separate from audit and engineering diagnostics. It never renders parser/executor payloads, internal identifiers, codes, machine-shaped historical input, or technical failure text; those values are replaced by a concise business explanation without changing the underlying audit evidence.
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- Preserve creator and input-turn attribution with encrypted input at rest. Routine removal is archive/restore; irreversible purge is not exposed.
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- Keep AgentBus authorization as a separate administrator-controlled channel boundary.
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@@ -33,6 +34,7 @@ This model fits a single-organization deployment while enforcing least privilege
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- Existing accounts migrate as administrators; newly created team leads and users require explicit task grants.
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- Permission revocation can block an existing task at confirmation or browser claim even when an administrator attempts the transition.
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- Cross-user operational visibility is intentionally separated from normal task mutation and technical debugging surfaces.
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- Dashboard acceptance is based on leadership questions and business-readable drill-through, not on reproducing task history or technical audit records.
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## Supersedes
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@@ -44,3 +46,4 @@ This model fits a single-organization deployment while enforcing least privilege
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- `control-plane/migrations/016_team_lead_operations_dashboard.sql`
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- `control-plane/migrations/017_user_business_route_authorizations.sql`
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- `.project-docs/30-worklog/tasks/20260901-account-system-impl-d4e7a2.md`
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- `.project-docs/30-worklog/tasks/20260901-leadership-dashboard-c4b9e1.md`
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@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
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| RELEASE-001 | Current artifacts, filenames, versions, and SHA-256 values are defined only by `dist/release-manifest.json`. | Active | 2026-08-28 | Release and delivery | [Release manifest](../../dist/release-manifest.json) |
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| SAFETY-001 | Real ERP access/write, task mutation, extension reload, service restart, deployment, and external delivery require explicit task-scoped authorization. | Active | 2026-08-28 | Operations and maintenance | [Governance](../../AGENTS.md) |
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| NETWORK-001 | In the trusted internal deployment, AgentBus roster attachment URLs may resolve to internal/private addresses; HTTPS, credential rejection, DNS pinning, redirect validation, bounds, and digest checks remain. | Active | 2026-08-31 | AgentBus attachment ingress | [Reply contract](../../agent设计规范/agentbus-reply-contract.md) |
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| AUTH-001 | The fixed deployment scope uses administrator-managed `admin`, `team_lead`, and `user` accounts, owner-isolated normal tasks, a read-only leadership dashboard, and explicit non-admin task-route allowlists. | Active | 2026-09-01 | Authentication, authorization, audit, and operations oversight | [ADR](AUTH-001-fixed-scope-account-authorization.md) |
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| AUTH-001 | The fixed deployment scope uses administrator-managed `admin`, `team_lead`, and `user` accounts, owner-isolated normal tasks, an aggregate-first read-only leadership dashboard, and explicit non-admin task-route allowlists. | Active | 2026-09-01 | Authentication, authorization, audit, and operations oversight | [ADR](AUTH-001-fixed-scope-account-authorization.md) |
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## Superseded Decisions
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